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Abstract 
 
This study examines the expanding role of fiscal policy at a time of financial crisis. It analyses the 
stimulative fiscal measures of the Russian government in 2008-2010 and compares these with simi-
lar actions taken in other countries. The risks and limitations associated with the development and 
implementation  of  the  measures  are  analyzed.  The  macroeconomic  effects  of  the  fiscal  policy 
measures are estimated using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, the fiscal multip-
liers are calculated, and factors influencing multiplier size are examined. 
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Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov 






Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan finanssipolitiikan kasvavaa roolia talouskriisin aikana. Tutkimus ana-
lysoi  Venäjän  hallituksen  finanssipoliittista  elvytystä  vuosina  2008–2010  ja  vertaa  sitä  muiden 
maiden elvytystoimenpiteisiin. Elvytykseen liittyviä riskejä ja rajoitteita myös arvioidaan. Lisäksi 
finanssipolitiikan  makrotaloudellisia  vaikutuksia  estimoidaan  rakenteellisella  vektoriautoregres-
siivisellä (SVAR) mallilla. Tähän kuuluu finanssipolitiikan kertoimien (fiscal multipliers) laskemi-
nen. Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan myös kertoimien kokoon vaikuttavia tekijöitä. 
 
Avainsanat: finanssipoliittinen elvytys, finanssipolitiikan kestävyys, SVAR, finanssipolitiikan  
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1  Introduction  
 
During the world financial crisis the role of fiscal policy and fiscal measures as the primary means 
of stabilization were extensively reviewed. This was partly due to the substantial limitations on the 
effectiveness of stimulative monetary policy measures under conditions of uncertainty on the finan-
cial markets. Although the policy rates of many central banks were lowered to minimum levels, de-
terioration of monetary transmission mechanism due to destabilization of the financial system and 
increased risks in the real sector prevented the achievement of fully favourable results. In this situa-
tion  many  central  banks  resorted  to  unconventional  monetary  measures  (see  Minegishi  and 
Cournède (2010) and Ishi et al. (2009) for a review). At the same time, many governments devel-
oped stimulative fiscal programmes, which included measures aimed at both financial market stabi-
lization and support of aggregate demand. 
Implementation of monetary policy in Russia was faced the same and sometimes even 
worse difficulties. Up to the start of the second half of  2008, under a tightly managed exchange rate 
regime, the main source of money growth in the Russian economy was the growth of the central 
bank’s international reserves. In 2009 the role of net claims on government in money growth in-
creased. It is assumed that later on, after a flexible exchange rate regime is put in place, the interest 
rate policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) will have a greater impact. But at present, with se-
riously disfunctional financial markets, it seems unlikely that a change in interest rates effected by 
the CBR would have a substantial immediate influence on dynamics of monetary and credit aggre-
gates or on aggregate demand. It would also seem that any attempt to stimulate the economy via 
currency depreciation would fail, for a number of reasons, including the huge volume of foreign-
currency-denominated liabilities - amounting in 2008 to 30% of private nonfinancial sector share of 
GDP and 19% of banking sector share. In these circumstances, fiscal measures could play an impor-
tant role in macroeconomic stabilization. 
In this study we examine the growing role of fiscal policy during the financial crisis. Sec-
tion 2 contains an analysis of Russian stimulative fiscal measures and some risks and restrictions 
associated with their implementation. We present a comparative analysis of Russian stimulative fis-
cal measures versus those of the countries from different regions of the world. Section 3 of the 
study presents quantitative estimations of macroeconomic effects of stimulative fiscal measures 
based on a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model and data on the Russian economy in Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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2000-2007. We evaluate fiscal multipliers and examine the factors that affect their sizes and corre-
spondingly determine the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2   Assessing the efficiency of stimulative fiscal measures 
 
Under conditions of financial crisis many countries have developed fiscal stimulative measures. The 
measures differ greatly from country to country depending on the scale of crisis and on the opportu-
nity of the country to worsen its budget balance, taking into account the problem of long run sus-
tainability of public finances. The speed at which the fiscal measures are set in motion is deter-
mined by the supposed duration of financial crisis and the time needed to achieve the desired mac-
roeconomic impact. The composition of fiscal stimulus depends on the aims of the government as 
well as on the comparative effectiveness of revenue and spending measures in stimulating domestic 
demand. 
Historical experience provides evidence on various fiscal policies of varying effectiveness 
in dealing with severe financial crises. During the Great Depression of the 1930s in the USA, gov-
ernment fiscal measures were delayed, and this led to a deterioration of the economy. It became 
necessary to employ additional stimulative fiscal measures later on, to overcome the crisis. The fis-
cal actions of the Japanese authorities at the end of the 1990s, as asset prices plummeted, provided 
only temporary stability - not sufficient to achieve a sustained recovery. Meanwhile, prompt and 
sizeable stimulative measures by the Korean authorities enabled them to overcome the crisis with-
out the need for more extensive fiscal measures (Spilimbergo et al. (2008)). 
Thus it appears that the optimal fiscal package should meet certain requirements. It should 
be timely because of the immediate need for action, large enough, well diversified according to the 
impact of financial crisis on the national economy, as long lasting as the downturn, and adaptable to 
changing conditions. Moreover, the fiscal measures should be coordinated with antirecessionary 
policy of other countries and sustainable so as not to lead to a debt explosion. In particular, it should 
include the option to reverse the measures. Several countries such as Russia should also keep in 
mind the high volatility of capital flows and low ratings of public and private debt. 
 
2.1  Russian stimulative fiscal measures in 2008-2010 
 
 
The Russian government began to implement stimulative fiscal measures to struggle with crisis 
consequences in the second half of the year 2008.  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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In 2008 the fiscal stimulus amounted to 1.8% of GDP
4 and included: 
  Transfers to  strategic public  companies  and  financial organizations for capitalization 
purposes (0.8% of GDP); 
  Placing funds of National Wealth Fund (NWF) in Vnesheconombank (VEB) deposits for 
subsequent provision of long-term subordinate loans to Russian financial organizations 
(1.0% of GDP). 
In  2009  the  Russian  government  implemented  both  revenue  and  spending  measures
5 
amounting to 6.4% of GDP, as follows: 
  Cutting taxes on private and corporate sectors of economy (2.0% of GDP); 
  Transfer payments to those affected by the crisis categories of households and sectors of 
the economy (2.0% of GDP) as well as to the strategic public companies and financial 
organizations (1.4% of GDP); 
  Budget spending on final consumption (0.4% of GDP); 
  Provision of loans to financial organizations, mainly via the intermediation of VEB at 
the expense of NWF funds (0.6% of GDP). 
In 2010 stimulative fiscal measures of the Russian government are expected to amount to 
5.0% of GDP and will include: 
  Temporary tax measures in 2010 by maintaining tariffs on insurance payments equal to 
the single social tax rate (although an increase of these tariffs was intended) as well as a 
continuation of stimulative tax measures introduced in the previous year (3.7% of GDP); 
  Transfer payments to Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) antirecessionary fund 
(0.3% of GDP), to strategic public corporations (0.2% of GDP) and subsidies to Russian 
companies and financial organizations (less than 0.1% of GDP); 
  Budget spending on final consumption (less than 0.1% of GDP) and on capitalization of 
financial  organizations  using  the  mechanism  of  government  bonds  (OFZ)  (0.2%  of 
GDP); 
  Investment spending (less than 0.1% of GDP); 
                                                 
4 In paragraphs 2.1.-2.2. we use estimations of GDP for 2008 to evaluate the size of stimulus. Although stimulative 
measures influenced the value of GDP in 2008 it is convenient to use this index to compare different countries. 
5 Although transfers are formally a part of government spending, taking into consideration their economic nature, they 
can be viewed as measures similar to tax cuts. Later in this study they are considered together with revenue measures. Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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  Reserved funds (0.5% of GDP). 
Thus  presumably,  should  all  the  projected  measures  be  realized,  the  fiscal  stimulative 
package of 2008-2010 could amount to 13.2% of GDP
6, including 10.4% of GDP in revenue meas-
ures and 2.8% of GDP in spending measures (of which 1.6% of GDP for providing loans at the ex-
pense of NWF and budget funds; see Figure 1). It is important to keep in mind that in 2010 and the 
following years additional stimulative fiscal measures may be implemented depending on the scale 
of the impact of financial crisis on the Russian economy. At the same time, the Russian government 
is planning to work out a strategy of step-by-step coordinated exit from stimulative measures. 
 






Revenue measures Transfer payments
Loans provision Other spending measures
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance of Russia; The program of stimulative measures by the Russian government for 2009; 
Main directions of antirecessionary activity of the Russian government for 2010. 
 
2.2  Comparative analysis of Russian stimulative fiscal measures 
 
 
In this paragraph we present a comparative analysis of the size, composition and the speed of stimu-
lative fiscal measures implemented by the Russian government and governments of several G20 
countries. We also include Kazakhstan, one of the largest CIS economies. 
The size of stimulative fiscal package as projected by the Russian government is one of the 
biggest, relative to GDP, in the countries reviewed in this study (see Figure 2). It is determined by 
                                                 
6 It is noteworthy that implementation of stimulative measures is planned almost fully at the expense of federal budget 
funds. This should reduce the threat to long run sustainability of Russian regional budgets and extra budgetary funds.  
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the necessity to compensate the significant drop in aggregate demand, both domestic and external, 
in Russian production and to increase the stability of Russian financial markets given the substantial 
deterioration of borrowing conditions on the international and domestic markets. The scale of the 
stimulative package can be explained by the huge amounts available to the Russian government via 
the oil and gas funds held at the CBR. Large stimulativ e fiscal packages implemented by China, 
Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia can also be explained by huge reserves obtained from exporting 
goods and commodities. Meanwhile, the stimulative fiscal packages of the European Union coun-
tries, which face tight fiscal restraints under the Maastricht treaty, are more moderate. 
 



















































































































Revenue measures Spending measures
 
* For comparison, transfer payments are attributed to spending measures in this figure. But because of their importance 
in quantitative estimation of macroeconomic effects of Russian stimulative measures, we consider transfer payments 
together with revenue measures. 
Sources: IMF, Eurostat, Reuters, Goldman Sachs, Trading Economics, Ministry of Finance of Russia, The pro-
gramme of stimulative measures by the Russian government for 2009, Main directions of antirecessionary actions of the Rus-
sian government for 2010, Nikolaev et al. (2009). 
 
  Spending measures are key to the stimulative fiscal packages of most of the countries (see 
Figure 2). In the packages of fourteen of the countries, the share of spending measures is on average 
a little less than three-fourths. Several countries, such as Brazil and the UK, rely more on revenue Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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measures. In the fiscal stimulus of the Russian government, the share of revenue measures is also 
larger: 78.7%, or 42.7% if transfer payments are included in spending). 
Different governments use various periods for implementing fiscal stimulus, but the main 
part of the measures on average was realized in 2009 (see Figure 3). This can be explained by an 
attempt to support the economy in the most difficult period of financial crisis. The share of stimula-
tive measures of the Russian government, which was realized in the year of 2009, is presumably 
48.9%, and the respective shares for 2008 and 2010 are 13.4% and 37.7%. For 2010, most of the 
national authorities are planning to limit their fiscal stimuli. Several countries - in particular USA, 
Germany and China - are planning to realize the bulk of stimulus in 2010, probably reflecting the 
assumptions of the governments of longer crisis duration and correspondingly of the need for a 
longer period of government support. It is also noteworthy that some countries, including Russia, 
realized part of stimulative measures already in 2008. 
 





































































Sources: IMF, Eurostat, Reuters, Goldman Sachs, Trading Economics, Ministry of Finance of Russia, The program of 
stimulative measures by the Russian government for 2009, Main directions of antirecessionary activity of the Russian gov-
ernment for 2010. 
 
Analysis of the realization of the fiscal stimulus package is essential for assessing its over-
all macroeconomic effect. Here we discuss the magnitudes of different types of stimulative fiscal 
measures by the Russian government (on the basis of approaches used by IMF experts in Horton et 
al. (2009). Figure 4 presents Russian stimulative fiscal measures by type for 2008-2010.  
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Other measures
Reserved funds














Sources: Ministry of Finance of Russia, The programme of stimulative measures by the Russian government for 2009, Main 
directions of antirecessionary activity of the Russian government for 2010. 
 
 
Tax cuts constitute a substantial part of the fiscal stimulus package in Russia. These in-
clude cuts for capital tax (in the form of a profit tax cut), in export duties on fuel and energy, as well 
as a new payment procedure (included in “other tax” cuts in Figure 4) and a reduction in social 
taxes paid by corporate sector. The latter being implemented even though in recent years the bal-
ances of extra budgetary funds have been negative although the Russian government plans to stabi-
lize them within the next few years (particularly via tax-rate increases).  
No significant increases in spending on final consumption and investment are planned as 
part of fiscal stimulus. Furthermore, planned investment spending is being reduced substantially or 
postponed in exchange for expenditures that produce quicker impacts on economic activity and are 
easier to discontinue. 
Transfer payments are also used extensively by the Russian government to overcome the 
crisis. Russian authorities had started to implement measures of support of strategic corporations of 
selected economic sectors such as military-industrial and banking spheres already in 2008. These 
includes financing of interest payments, granting additional subsidies and installment tax payment 
and capitalization. The latter is partially implemented by issuing government bonds as well as re-Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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purchases of “bad assets”. For 2010, the Russian government intends to issue a substantial amount 
of OFZ in Russian financial organizations in exchange for voting shares. Loan provision, especially 
long-term, makes up a large part of Russian fiscal stimulus and is almost entirely financed at the 
expense of NWF funds. These types of discrete measures could potentially benefit from being better 
targeted and easier to reverse in the following years. At the same time, although these measures will 
obviously improve the financial health of the corporative sector, the overall macroeconomic effect 
is questionable and will be determined by the efficiency of their implementation. 
On the whole the composition of fiscal stimulus package in Russia indicates the lack of 
measures that have unambiguous direct effects on aggregate demand, which obscures its overall 
macroeconomic effect. Yet this composition also means that most of measures (apart from tax cuts 
and certain transfer payments) can be relatively easily discontinued and therefore pose little risk to 
the sustainability of public finance. 
 
2.3  Common risks and limitations associated with realization of fiscal measures 
 
 
A number of risks and limitations on implementation of stimulative fiscal packages related to size 
and composition are to be taken into account. It is important to compare desirable size of the pack-
age with the country’s ability to reduce its budget balance and the ensuing impact on long-run sus-
tainability of public finances. 
In order to reduce these risks, it is necessary to implement with caution tax cuts as well as 
increases in transfer payments and budget spending, especially wages and welfare payments. It may 
be inappropriate to make these changes on a continual basis. Moreover it is important not to extend 
fiscal measures of a short-term nature to the long run. For this it is useful to stipulate the period of 
validity of each type of measures (IMF, 2009b). 
Authorities of most countries have implemented stimulative fiscal measures in the short 
run but have plans to tighten fiscal policy in the medium run in order to improve the sustainability 
of public finances. IMF experts suppose that deterioration of main budget indicators in developed 
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Figure 5. Budget balances (deficit (–) / profit (+)) and government debts of developed and developing countries in 2007 












































Budget balance of the developed countries
Budget balance of the developing countries
Government debt of the developed countries
Governmnet debt of the developing countries
 
Source: Horton et al., 2009. 
 
Following realization of the massive fiscal expansion and general deterioration of the mac-
roeconomic environment, the issue of long term fiscal sustainability in Russia has also begun to 
come under scrutiny. The revenues of the federal budget and general budget have noticeably de-
creased, mainly because of the fall in oil and gas revenues. Additional decrease in revenues and the 
growth of budget spending measures are projected as part of the fiscal stimulus. This will lead to a 
large deficit, registered for the first time since 2000. In 2009 the deficit on the general budget 
reached 6.2% of GDP and was financed using of substantial part of the reserves as well as by in-
creasing the internal public debt. On the other hand, Russia possesses considerable reserves in oil 
and gas funds as well as funds in national currency at the CBR. At the end of 2009, net CBR liabili-
ties to general government amounted to 14.3% of GDP (of which the combined size of the two 
funds was 11.8% of GDP). This substantially exceeds the level of Russian general public debt 
(10.6% of GDP at the end of 2009). Moreover, in the medium run the Russian government is plan-
ning to tighten gradually its fiscal policy by decreasing the size of the deficit of federal budget to 
1.0% of GDP (starting with 2013) as stated in the Budget Code of the Russian Federation. This 
could be achieved partly by means of a number of tax increases in 2010 (see Figure 6). 
 Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
                                
 
  14 













2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Revenues Expenditures Balance
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Russia, Treasury of Russia. 
 
Although the growth of government borrowing for budget deficit financing will presuma-
bly lead to an increase in interest payments on the federal debt amounting to as much as 1.0% of 
GDP by 2012 (0.4% of GDP in 2008), the Russian public debt by the end of 2012 will amount to 
15.4% of GDP and thus remain at a reasonably low level. 
Thus not only in the short run but also in the medium run there is almost no threat to the 
sustainability of Russia’s public finances, even with a large budget deficit. Although additional 
stimulative fiscal  measures  could  be implemented  should the financial crisis  be elongated, that 
could worsen the sustainability of public finances in the long run. 
 
 




Analysis of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy is a central issue in modern macroeconomic 
modeling exercises. According to most relevant economic theories, expansionary fiscal policy posi-
tively affects aggregate demand and can thus be effectively used to stimulate economic growth. At 
the same time, the empirical findings regarding the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in differ- 
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ent countries and time vary considerably
7. There is evidence of non-linear and even reverse effect of 
the fiscal policy changes (see Giavazzi et al. (2000) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) for examples). 
It is therefore essential to understand the degree of uncertainty surrounding the quantitative out-
come of fiscal stimulus measures. In our study we will try to estimate the macroeconomic effect of 
fiscal policy basing on pre-crisis historical data and will review the factors that may affect the per-
formance of fiscal measure under the current circumstances. 
 
3.1  Econometric approach and initial data 
 
In recent macroeconomic studies several different approaches are used to estimate the macroeco-
nomic effects of fiscal policy. These include case-by-case narrative studies, econometric modeling 
and construction of large scale general equilibrium models. Yet one of the most versatile, while not 
exactly free of criticism (see, for example, Ramey (2009)), and therefore applicable to both devel-
oped and emerging economies
8 methods is the SVAR model. 
In our study we estimate SVAR using the identification scheme proposed by  Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002), which has since than become a benchmark specification of fiscal SVARs. The 
basic specification of the model is: 
Xt=A(L)Xt-1+Ut  (1) 
, where Xt ≡ [T,G,Y]’ is a three-dimensional vector of government net revenues, government expen-
ditures and output; A(L) is a lag polynomial; Ut ≡ [ut
T, ut
G, ut
Y] is the corresponding vector of re-
duced form residuals. These residuals have little economic significance but can be presented as the 
















Y  (4) 
Equation (2) shows that unexpected movements in net revenues are a function of unex-
pected movements in output and structural shocks to government spending and net revenues. Equa-
tion (3) states that unexpected movements in government spending also derive from unexpected 
movements in output and structural shocks to net revenues and government spending. Finally, equa-
                                                 
7 See, for example, Perotti (2005) who finds that the macroeconomic effect of fiscal stimulus had decreased starting in 
the 1980s. 
8 See, for example Sturm et al,(2009) who use VAR model to assess the effectiveness of government investment in oil 
exporting countries, including Russia. Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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tion (4) states that unexpected movements in output are related to unexpected movements in net 
revenues and government spending and to structural shocks to output. 
The a1 coefficient, which gives the impact of output shock on government revenues, can be 
estimated on the basis of the institutional characteristics of the Russian tax system. Apart from so-
cial taxes, all Russian taxes are proportional flat-rate taxes. This means that in theory the tax base 
elasticity of tax revenues should be equal to unity. Some simple empirical exercises
9 can provide 
general confirmation of this assumption. We therefore set the a1 =1 for the purposes of SVAR struc-
tural identification.  
Following Blanchard and Perotti we set b1=0, since the use of quarterly data virtually 
eliminates the possibility of immediate discretionary fiscal policy decisions made in response to 
output fluctuations. As regards the automatic fiscal stabilizers that could mechanically alter the 
government spending (such as various forms of social benefits), they can be considered negligible 
in Russia.  
Thus, with a1 and b1 established, c1 and c2 may be estimated. We need however to make an 
assumption regarding the priorities of the government when it determines the size of revenues and 
expenditures and set a2 and b2 accordingly. We believe that it is more likely that (at least during the 
period 2000-2007) the government decided on the amount of revenues first and then determined the 
amount of expenditures. We therefore set a2=0 and estimate b2, allowing for the revenues shocks to 
affect government spending but not vice versa. 
We base our data choices on SNA instead of public finance statistics, since the former pro-
vide much more economically homogenous time series. We use taxes net of net transfers and subsi-
dies as the government revenue variable (T) and interpolate the annual SNA data to get the quar-
terly dynamics proportionally using the public finance statistics indicator of general government 
revenues. The sum of government final consumption and government fixed capital investment was 
used as an indicator of government spending (G), which was also interpolated into quarterly dynam-
ics using the public finance statistics indicator of general government expenditures. The base index 
of GDP was used as the third variable (Y). In addition to these variables, the indicator of oil prices 
in ruble terms
10 (OIL), which presumably had a significant influence on both public finance indica-
tors and the economic growth, was added to the model as an exogenous variable. All indicators are 
                                                 
9 We compared the average growth rates of revenues from different taxes and the average growth rates of respective tax 
bases during the period 2000-2008 and found close matches in the majority of cases.  
10 See Restrepo and Rincon (2006) for an example of augmenting the fiscal SVAR for Chile and Columbia with terms 
of trade variable.  
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in logs, in real terms (deflated with GDP deflator) and seasonally adjusted with X-12. For the esti-
mation, we used the time sample of 2000-2007. 
Unit root tests indicate that the oil price variable may be considered as stationary in levels, 
the indicators of government revenues and government expenditures are trend-stationary, while the 
results for GDP are ambiguous. Based on these results and international experience, we decided to 
use the variables in levels and  to add the deterministic linear trend and a constant  to the SVAR, 
which is consistent with the specification initially proposed by Blanchard and Perotti. 
 
Table 1  KPSS unit root tests results 
Variable  Test specification  LM-Statistic 
T 
constant  0.485* 
constant and trend  0.143 
G 
constant  0.755* 
constant and trend  0.126 
Y 
constant  0.751* 
constant and trend  0.181** 
OIL 
constant  0.155 
constant and trend  0.154** 
* – rejection of the null of stationarity at 1%-level 
** – rejection of the null of stationarity at 5%-level  
 
The number of lags in the model was set to 3. The information criteria prescribed longer lag length 
but increasing it beyond 3 caused the model’s instability and the presence of unit roots in the 
model’s autoregressive polynomials. Accordingly we decided to limit the lag length to 3 and ensure 
the adequate performance of the model. One lag of oil prices indicator was also added to the model. 
 
3.2  Results of SVAR estimation 
 
 
The estimates of contemporaneous coefficients of the SVAR model are presented in Table 2. The 
contemporaneous effects of fiscal policy on GDP are represented by c1 (the impact of revenues on 
GDP) and c2 (the impact of spending on GDP) coefficients. Both are positive and statistically sig-
nificant. The positive effect of government spending on GDP is in line with the theoretical assump-
tions, while positive effect of government revenues is not. This unexpected result may be explained 
by the fact that during the reviewed (rather short) period both GDP and government revenues were 
growing rapidly. The government revenues growth however was mainly due to the commodities Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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price  growth  (in  fact  the  tax  system  was  designed  to  automatically  compensate  these  kinds  of 
shocks). Therefore even with the indicator of oil prices included into the model it may difficult to 
empirically distinguish between the positive oil price effect and negative government revenues ef-
fect, since these two were occurring simultaneously and we have very little data to assess pure (i.e. 
not followed by the government revenues growth) oil price shock or pure (i.e. not caused by oil 
price fluctuations) tax shock. Yet we may conclude that we see no empirical evidence of any pro-
nounced negative effect of government revenues shocks. Besides the contemporaneous effects of 
fiscal variables on GDP we also estimate the b2 coefficient that reflects the interrelationship be-
tween government revenues and expenditures. The estimated coefficient is negative meaning that 
the spending and tax shocks were codirectional (which may be relevant for meaningful fiscal stance 
changes, but may not be consistent with long run fiscal sustainability).  
 
Table 2  Estimated contemporaneous coefficients 
 
c1  





















In order to assess the overall dynamic impact of fiscal shocks on GDP we look at impulse response 
functions, with bootstrapped Hall 95% percentile confidence intervals (Figure 7). The estimated 
impulse responses are generally in line with theory. GDP declines in response to government reve-
nues shock and increases after government expenditure shock and the overall impact of government 
expenditures is substantially larger then of government revenues. The responses of fiscal variables 
to GDP shocks are unclear signifying the absence of evident pro(counter-)cyclical fiscal policy, al-






Figure 7  Impulse responses  
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3.3  Assessment of values of fiscal multipliers for the Russian economy 
 
In order to obtain the measure of the overall magnitude of fiscal policy effect we also estimate the 
absolute size of the macroeconomic impact and compare it with the respective indicators estimated 
for other economies. We use fiscal multipliers as a measure of the absolute value of the fiscal 
shocks’ macroeconomic impact. The multiplier is defined as cumulative GDP growth in 3 years af-
ter the fiscal shock (which is government revenues decrease or government expenditures increase) 
relative to the size of the change of the fiscal variable. Basing on the estimated impulse responses 
the government revenues and government expenditures multipliers in Russia amounted to 0,1 and 
0,6 respectively. These results may be compared with the estimates of fiscal multipliers given as a 
benchmark for developed and emerging market economies by the IMF (IMF WEO, 2008). The re-
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sults obtained by Perotti (2005) for a number of developed economies
11 also reveal the scope of 
possible diversity in the fiscal multipliers estimates. 
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Thus, the estimated size of fiscal multipliers for Russia is generally in line with existing empirical 
studies. Both multipliers are positive, meaning that we could not find evidence of an adverse effect 
of fiscal expansions on output. At the same time, the fiscal multipliers are not very large (the reve-
nues multiplier in particularly, which may be due to tax revenue and oil price comovements, as dis-
cussed above, and should therefore be interpreted with caution), signifying the limited efficiency of 
fiscal policy in increasing real economic growth. Based on these estimates, we would expect that, 
should the whole projected stimulus package be realized, the induced effect on GDP growth would 
amount to 0.5-1% growth in 2009 and 1-1.5% in 2010. This supposition is generally in line with the 
IMF (2009a) estimates of world GDP growth of 0.8-3.2% in 2009 and 0.1-0.9% in 2010
12. 
The results obtained by means of econometric analysis and presented above reflect deve l-
opments in 2000-2007. It is natural to expect that the dramatic changes  in general macroeconomic 
                                                 
11 We present the results obtained by Perotti on the time sample of 1980-2001. 
12  Fiscal  multipliers  used  by  IMF  experts  in  these estimations  were  0.3-0.6  for  government  revenues, 0.5-1.8  for  
government investments and 0.3-1.0 for other government expenditures.  
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conditions would influence the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy. In these circumstances, the 
estimated multipliers should be used cautiously, and the factors that could affect them should also 
be taken into account.  
The size of fiscal multiplier is to a large extent determined by various types of “leakages” 
(Spilimbergo et al (2009)), which can prevent the GDP increase from even matching the size of fis-
cal expansion (resulting in some fiscal multipliers of less than unity). It is possible to find a number 
of  macroeconomic  indicators  determining  the  size  of  these  leakages  and  to  separate  them  into 
groups depending on the “leakage” type. 
Propensity to save. Obviously, the larger the share of funds injected into the economy via 
fiscal  expansion  that  is  subsequently  saved  and  not  spent  on  consumption  and  investment,  the 
smaller the macroeconomic effect of the fiscal measure. The impact of economic crisis on this indi-
cator is ambiguous. On the one hand, the economic agents may, for precautionary reasons, increase 
their propensity to save, because of the greater uncertainty regarding future incomes. On the other 
hand, the propensity to save may decrease because of confidence regarding the future economic re-
covery and entirely rationale behavior or simply because of the necessity to maintain consumption 
at a hand-to-mouth level in conditions of declining welfare. The statistical data are more likely to 
confirm the former proposition (according to Rosstat, the propensity to save in the first three quar-
ters of 2009 amounted to 13% compared to 7.2% in the first three quarters of 2008). This may re-
duce the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. The process of financial wealth accumulation, not only in 
the household sector but also in NFC and banking sectors, may just as well impede the effectiveness 
of fiscal stimulus. In these circumstances, CBR actions aimed at reducing the yields of financial as-
sets (including the lowering of interest rates and stabilization of foreign exchange rate) are essential. 
Propensity to import. It is also clear that the spending of the funds provided by the fiscal 
expansion on imports would diminish the stimulating effect on the domestic economy. While in the 
pre-crisis period import growth rates were exceptionally high in Russia, they dropped sharply in 
2009, one reason being ruble depreciation. We therefore assume that, under current circumstances, 
the leakages into import purchases will be smaller than in 2000-2007. 
Composition of public finance variables. It is generally assumed that an increase in gov-
ernment expenditures (particularly government investment) would be the most effective stimulus, 
rather than tax cuts or transfers. Considering that government investment makes up only an insig-
nificant part of the fiscal stimulus package as well as the government’s plans to reduce the budget 
deficit mainly at the expense of these types of expenditures, we would expect to see a reduction in Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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the share of spending on final consumption and investment in the total volume of government ex-
penditures. Although more precise targeting of the remaining expenditures may hopefully increase 
their efficiency, we conclude that generally the changes in the composition of public finance indica-
tors will make direct macroeconomic stimulus more difficult to achieve. 
Inflation. Another substantial “leakage”, which impedes efficient fiscal stimulus, is the 
transformation of aggregate growth not into real GDP but into prices growth. In this regard, current 
fiscal expansion could be expected to be rather efficient since it takes place in a much less inflation-
ary environment and while the actual output is probably well beyond potential.  
Monetary conditions.  The  interactions  between fiscal  and monetary policy may be ex-
tremely important and may determine the sizes of fiscal multipliers (see Christiano et al. (2009)). 
Fiscal expansion may only be effective if it is not followed by monetary tightening. The tightening 
may result from crowding out by increased government demand, either in the money markets via a 
rise in interest rates in connection with deficit financing, or in the goods and services markets (see 
Ducoudré (2005)). This however will occur only if the money supply is kept constant during the 
fiscal expansion. In the case of Russia, the sovereign funds will be the main sources of deficit fi-
nancing (implying automatic increase of money supply) with no intent to rely much on the domestic 
money markets. Therefore we do not expect the fiscal expansion to trigger a tightening of monetary 
conditions.   
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4  Conclusions 
 
 
The world financial crisis, which caused the dysfunction of financial markets, has substantially re-
duced the effectiveness of monetary policy. The necessity of adapting to new external conditions 
was an additional factor that impeded the financial intermediation by the Russian banking system 
and accordingly the effectiveness of monetary policy measures undertaken by the Central Bank of 
Russia. In this situation, the role of fiscal policy as an instrument of economic stimulation has in-
creased notably. Large fiscal stimulus packages and consequent increases of budget deficits have 
come to play a major role in the macroeconomic policies of many countries. 
Russian stimulative fiscal measures are large scale and, according to our estimation, are 
potentially among the most sizeable ones in the world. At the same time, because of substantial 
sovereign funds, a low level of public debt and apparent dedication to consequent gradual lowering 
of the budget deficit, we see no serious threat to sustainability of the Russian public finances in the 
medium run. The substantial part of fiscal stimulus consists of targeted transfer payments, such as 
financial aid to strategic public companies and financial organizations, which should contribute to 
financial stabilization of the private sector. These fiscal measures however do not stimulate aggre-
gate demand unconditionally, and they include few components that influence the GDP indicator 
directly, such as investment spending and spending on final consumption. Moreover, according to 
projections by the Russian government, the share of this type of spending in total budget spending 
will be reduced during 2010-2012. This corresponds to the task of maintaining sustainability of 
public finances but reduces the effectiveness of government spending as an instrument of macro-
economic stimulation. Thus the fiscal stimulus package creates the necessary prerequisites for eco-
nomic recovery but may not fully compensate for the decline in aggregate demand that occurred 
during the crisis. The effect of the proposed fiscal measures estimated based on the SVAR model 
are positive contributions to GDP growth of 0.5-1.0% in 2009 and 1.0-1.5% in 2010. Alexey A. Ponomarenko – Sergey A. Vlasov   Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
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